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I. INTRODUCTION
During the twentieth century, the practice of trading securities
on the basis of inside information has created policy challenges for
legislators, judges, and lawyers. Prior to the Great Depression, the
practice was infrequently the subject of litigation;' since the stock
market crash in 1929, statutory attempts to understand the nature
of insider trading and to circumscribe spheres of unacceptable be-
havior have been significant.2
The nature and extent of the prohibition have not remained
1 Under common law that developed early this century, the trading of securities based
on undisclosed inside information was considered fraudulent. The leading case in this regard
is Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
2 The primary statutory sources of this prohibition are contained in the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 (the "1934 Act") and rules promulgated thereunder. 15 U.S.C. § 78
(1988). Most significant in this regard are § 16(b) and rule 10b-5. Section 16(b) states, in
part, the following:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been
obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship
to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale
and purchase, or any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted secur-
ity) within any period of less than six months, unless such security was acquired
in good faith in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and
be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such ben-
eficial owner, director or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the
security purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding
six months.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988). Rule 10b-5 states the
following:
It shall be unlawful for any person directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange, (1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to de-
fraud; (2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the cir-
cumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (3) to engage in any
act, practice or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1991).
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static since their creation under the 1934 Act. The earlier court
decisions construing the Act and its rules embodied an expansive-
ness of interpretation, culminating in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co.3 Texas Gulf Sulphur created the "abstain or disclose" doc-
trine, which applied to all trades on nonpublic information.4
Transactions in securities based on any exclusively held informa-
tion were considered to be tainted, regardless of the source and
ownership of the inside information employed. In reaction to the
expansive interpretation of rule 10b-5 under Texas Gulf Sulphur,
post-1960s decisions tended toward retrenchment, more strictly
construing statutory language and intent in an era of contraction.'
Likewise, legal scholarship diverges widely in its normative stance
regarding regulation of insider trading, with recommendations
ranging from complete legalization to stricter and more precisely
defined proscription than exists under current law.
While the different policy approaches of courts and legal
scholars are elaborately defended in detailed decisions and trea-
tises, the variation can be traced to more basic and general dis-
crepancies in the underlying paradigms that shape policy recom-
mendations. The following analysis examines the dimensions of
basic jurisprudence that most significantly affect a proponent's
policy perspective on insider trading. It is contended that strict
construction of insider trading laws is fundamentally a function of
legal positivist and economic-contract paradigms.1 Conversely,
' 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
Id. at 848.
For a discussion of this phenomenon, see Steven R. Salbu, Regulation of Insider
Trading in a Global Marketplace: A Uniform Statutory Approach, 66 TUL. L. REV. 837
(1992).
6 Hundreds of articles addressing various elements of this issue exist; the articles gener-
ally combine legal analysis with some economic, financial, or ethical examination, or some
combination of these. See, e.g., Jerome B. Baesel & Gary R. Stein, The Value of Informa-
tion: Inferences from the Profitability of Insider Trading, 14 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANAL. 553
(1979); Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Fed-
eral Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322 (1979); Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel,
The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1983); Jonathan R. Macey, From
Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules Against Insider Trading, 13 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 9 (1984); Henry G. Manne, In Defense of Insider Trading, 44 HARv. Bus. REV. 113
(1966).
7 The phrase "strict construction" is applied liberally here to refer to all efforts to curb
the legal curtailment of insider trading practices; it includes literal readings of existing laws,
as well as recommendations that these laws be amended to be less confining. The general
viewpoint of strict constructionists in regard to insider trading is that its regulation should
be minimized either through legislative reform or conservative statutory interpretation. The
strict construction approach in its most extreme form will be labelled "zero regulation"
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loose construction of these laws is the product of realist, post-real-
ist, and ethical-contract paradigms." Sections II through IV of this
Article describe the three relevant paradigm dichotomies (positiv-
ist/post-realist; economic/ethical; contract/property), and explain
how insider trading policy perspectives actually reflect basic phi-
losophy and orientation. Section V discusses the impact of the
phenomenon described in the proceeding sections.
The recognition of disparities of assumptions and models un-
derlying policy choices allows us to examine the real issues and
points of contention.9 This process refocuses our attention on the
more basic subtextual questions: should the laws of insider trading
be approached from positivist or non-positivist assumptions? To
what extent should they be examined economically versus ethi-
cally, and are they predominantly matters of contract or of
property?
II. LEGAL POSITIVIST PARADIGMS, LEGAL REALIST PARADIGMS, AND
POST-REALIST PARADIGMS
A. Legal Positivist Paradigms
Under the positivist approach to jurisprudence, the signifi-
cance of law exists in its rule or force.'" A distinction is made be-
tween the function of law, which provides for the social order by
command or compulsion, and the function of morality, which en-
compasses the individual's efforts to establish and embrace an eth-
ical or normative system."1 John Austin's sober analysis of law
herein.
The term "loose construction" is intended here to reflect the legislative and interpre-
tive characteristics opposite to those contained in the term "strict construction." See supra
note 7. Loose construction thus entails the liberal application of existing restrictions on in-
sider trading, as well as the reinforcement and elaboration of these laws under a program of
statutory reform aimed at eliminating disparities of information availability in the securities
markets. Loose construction tends to result in recommendations that will be labelled "sig-
nificant regulation" herein.
' Little work has been done on the structural analysis of insider trading decisions and
jurisprudence. Phillips has suggested that there are six competing currents, which he labels
idealism, traditionalism, economic behaviorism, paradigm case analysis, literalism, and tex-
tual structuralism. See David M. Phillips, An Essay: Six Competing Currents of Rule lOb-5
Jurisprudence, 21 IND. L. REv. 625 (1988).
"0 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT Of LAW (1961) (detailed discussion of tenets of legal
positivism); see also MALCOLM CLARK, THE ENTERPRISE OF LAW 153-56 (1987) (general dis-
cussion of tenets of legal positivism).
" See CLARK, supra note 10. Clark notes that positivist approaches were dominated by
[Vol. 66:373
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identifies the "source" or "author" of command, suggesting that
laws are simply policies established by the sovereign in power.
12
Positivism pervades much of the Anglo-American system of com-
mon law, particularly in its emphasis on process.13 In this sense,
the efficacy of the law in the positivist tradition is largely bound to
the fairness of its procedures.14
The relatively pragmatic approach of legal positivists empha-
sizes the integrity of the legal system and the level of functioning
that results. Positivism is modest in declining to identify universal
moral imperatives in a heterogeneous world of diverse and diver-
gent cultures. It is a position in jurisprudence potentially congenial
to cultural and ethical relativist stances: it insists on no superior
substantive approach, thereby evading temptation of ethnocentric
dogmatism. Yet, in its contention that law is ultimately pure and
detached from the moral and political fray, positivism has resisted
appeal to relativist scholars inclined to associate the cultural with
the political.
The command theory of law stands in contrast to conceptions
of society constrained by natural laws. Legal positivism departs
from eighteenth century natural law theory and its incorporation
of morality into normative legal frameworks.15 Whereas natural
the distinction between law and morality for over a hundred years. He observes as well the
influence of utilitarianism on positivists, who strove to achieve "the greatest good for the
greatest number," while still maintaining that reformation of bad law was the exclusive
province of legislative emendation, implying that bad law is nonetheless operative and
effective.
,2 John Austin, Lecture 5, in THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1832).
Austin's notion that law is derived from command of the sovereign is later criticized by
H.L.A. Hart, whose jurisprudence substitutes rules (which are obligatory, implying some
extra-coercive legitimacy) for sovereign orders (which are merely coercive). For a discussion
of the development of Hart's philosophy, see H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND
PHILOSOPHY (1984).
'3 The doctrine of stare decisis exemplifies the implicit incorporation of positivism
within the common law and its procedures. Taken very literally, stare decisis requires strict
adherence to properly established precedent regardless of the merits of the substantive law
being followed. The doctrine as tempered by considerations of fairness and justice in al-
lowing some latitude for altering precedent in case law represents a departure from rigid
adherence to legal positivist thinking. See, e.g., Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hosp., 208 A.2d
193, 205-08 (Pa. 1965) (overruling precedent in interests of "justice" and "reason").
" Hart observes, however, that both Austin and Bentham recognized the moral obliga-
tion to engage in civil disobedience when the law reaches a "certain degree of iniquity."
H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARv. L. REV. 593, 617
(1958).
," For a discussion of natural law, see THOMAS AQUINAS, SELECTED POLITICAL READINGS
(ed. 1959); JOHN M. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980); THOMAS HOBBES,
1992]
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law theorists sought to identify empirically the universal rights and
responsibilities of all persons to serve as normative judicial guide-
lines,16 the positivists demystified the law by denying any spiritual
or deistic source. The more modern proponents of the "legal natu-
ralist" position deem the descriptive or value-neutral study of law
to be inadequate. In this vein, Lon Fuller resists the positivist no-
tion that "law must be treated as a manifested fact of social au-
thority or power, to be studied for what it is and does, and not for
what it is trying to do or become."' 7
Positivism is opposed today by rights theorists such as Dwor-
kin, who contends that judges are bound not simply by rule or pre-
cedent, but by principle as well.' Dworkin distinguishes between
political principle, which involves individual rights, and political
policy, which concerns the general welfare. 9 In controversial cases,
he contends that judicial decision-making should consider the
rights that arise from political principle, but not the public interest
concerns that are a function of mere political policy. 0 Acknowledg-
ing what he calls the "political basis of law,"'" Dworkin departs
from the assumption of legal objectivity implicit in positivist con-
ceptions of law.22 This departure is crucial to the development of
legal realism23 and post-realism,24 in which the political nature of
PHILOSOPHICAL RUDIMENTS CONCERNING GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY (1651); JEAN JACQUES
ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1762).
6 In regard to economic regulation such as the prohibition of insider trading, the re-
ceived model of natural law is generally the neoclassical one derived from Adam Smith. See
ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776). Among the normative assumptions contained
in the neoclassical approach are the natural superiority of markets unfettered by govern-
mental regulation except as is necessary to support competition; the importance of individ-
ual freedom under conditions of readily available information; and the tendency of the in-
visible hand to regulate price, quantity, and labor costs in any market created under the
first two assumptions.
17 LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 145 (1969).
" See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81-130 (1977). Dworkin contends
that legal questions can be categorized as questions of policy and questions of principle; the
latter cannot be addressed by mere application of rule under a sustainable and defensible
system of ethics. Id.
1' RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 11 (1985).
20 Id.
21 Id. at 7.
2 Dworkin asserts that a controversial case may be supported by competing moral
principles, all of which are faithful to the rule book. Thus, because a judge's decision is
ultimately based on the principle that he or she believes to be correct, his or her decision in
this respect is political. Id. at 17.
" See infra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 31-42 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 66:373
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legislative and judicial behavior is a central assumption.
B. Legal Realist and Post-Realist Paradigms
Realism is a broadly inclusive description of legal theory that
is skeptical of a naivete ascribed as characteristic of the positivist
approach. Where the positivist perceives the law to be a given ac-
cording to an extant command or rule, the realist examines actual
relationships and behavior to determine the underlying structural
and systemic dynamics, which are not presumed to be value-neu-
tral. The critical matrix that such examination places over the
unquestioning positivism it seeks to supplant entails both the scru-
tiny of the laws themselves and the examination of the courts and
their participants. It is not coincidental that Oliver Wendell
Holmes, a pioneering realist, wrote during the late nineteenth cen-
tury in the context of flourishing social and literary criticism.2 5
Realists use linguistic and semiotic analysis to examine law be-
neath its surface. 6 They begin with the presumption that language
is indeterminate, i.e., capable of an infinite number of interpreta-
tions. If language is indeterminate, it follows that the neutral crea-
tion of rules by the legislature, and application of these rules by
the judiciary, is impossible. This failure of neutrality creates a vac-
uum in which interpretation becomes imperative and inevitable.
In the process of interpretation, judges cannot avoid the balancing
of interests and the imputation of values to ambiguous circum-
stances. 28 Unlike the legal naturalists, realists do not impute spe-
cific normative values to law. Rather, they approach legal decision-
2 The most famous of Holmes's documents that express his early version of legal real-
ism is a speech given at Boston University in 1897. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of
Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457 (1897).
" Id. at 464. Holmes favored critical analysis of legal documents and court decisions to
remove the mystique that laypersons often attributed to law, representing the popular vali-
dation of the assumption that the command, edict, or rule of law was in some sense divine
and therefore unquestionable.
"2 See HAROLD J. BERMAM & WILLIAM R. GREINER, THE NATURE AND FUNCTIONS OF LAW
482 (1980). Berman and Greiner speak of the indeterminacy of language as the "active side
of legal language." Id. The description suggests that attempts to fix language are artificial
and spurious.
" Subsumed within this debate is the further question of how evidence can and should
be used, and the degree to which probabilistic evidence has value under presumptions of
scientific neutrality versus socio-political influence. For a discussion of issues related to the
use of probability in law, see Jonathan J. Koehler & Daniel N. Shaviro, Veridical Verdicts:
Increasing Verdict Accuracy through the Use of Overtly Probabilistic Evidence and Meth-
ods, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 247 (1990).
1992]
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making sociologically, attempting to understand the political, so-
cial, and economic functions served by the actual'workings of the
legal system as it is observed both on paper and in action.29
While the realists acknowledge the subversion of pure motives
and integrity in the application of the law, they do not discard the
idealized concepts of purity and integrity. The traditional realist
(as opposed to the post-realist) accepts ontology, admitting the ex-
istence of truth while observing its manipulation and obfuscation
by humans. 3° For the realist, the descriptive challenge is to recog-
nize the particular dynamic forces at play in the development of
law, and the normative challenge is to remove the layers of debris
from the right or the truth hidden below.
Post-realist approaches to jurisprudence, in some ways related
to the Critical Legal Studies movement and literary deconstruc-
tion, accept the principle of the indeterminacy of language.31 Post-
realists emphasize the political nature of all efforts at interpreta-
tion, assuming not only that "the source of authority cannot speak
clearly" but also that "if pressed, she would not want to. ' 32 There
can be no objectivity of interpreters, and if interpretive communi-
ties exist,33 their consensus is a function of culture or contract and
not a manifestation of objective truth. 4
9 Jerome Frank has observed that judicial decisions within a single court are internally
inconsistent, i.e., that there is wide discrepancy among verdicts and sentences. See JEROME
FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 121 (1970). The phenomenon suggests that judicial
activity encompasses more than the rational attempts at consistency as purportedly occur
under stare decisis and the positivist view of law. Realism seeks to identify and examine the
extra-positivist social dynamic within the law.
30 See Michael S. Moore, The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn for the
Worse?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 871 (1989). (comparing and contrasting realist ontology to what
author labels "antirealist" framework).
3' See, e.g., Andrew Altman, Legal Realism, Critical Legal Studies, and Dworkin, 15
PHIL. & Pus. AFFAIRS 205 (1986); Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies and Constitutional
Law: An Essay in Deconstruction, 36 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1984).
3' MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 13 (1987).
See STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? 14 (1980). Fish states the
following:
[I]t is interpretive communities, rather than either the text or the reader, that
produce meanings .... Interpretive communities are made up of those who share
interpretive strategies not for reading but for writing texts, for constituting their
properties .... [S]ince the thoughts an individual can think and the mental oper-
ations he can perform have their source in some or other interpretive community,
he is as much a product of that community (acting as an extension of it) as the
meanings it enables him to produce.
Id.
" See Paul Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REV. 765 (1982).
[Vol. 66:373
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The deconstruction of legal texts is the post-realist method of
identifying the dynamic forces that shape the law. 35 Whereas the
realist views interpretation as the identification of extant mean-
ings, the post-realist admits to no "true interpretation" indepen-
dent of the forces of linguistic communities.3" From a viewpoint
since labelled the "institutional" approach,37 Stanley Fish suggests
that institutions in general -and professional bureaucracies in par-
ticular are sources of epistemology.38 Fish echoes the older institu-
tional school of sociological thought which seeks to expose organi-
zational policy as the subversive utilization of power and control in
the configuration of a social reality.39
Post-realists depart from realists in their denial of realist on-
tology: no objective truth exists apart from our individual minds or
our social conventions.40 For the post-realist, all efforts to discover
reality objectively4 are naive in their presumption that an actor
can shed convention and thereby gain neutrality. The postulate
that social reality is invariably invented renders the scientific
model for identifying truth futile in any event, since there is no
truth to glean apart from what other humans have created. The
application of political and sociological power models to these
post-realist assumptions suggests that good faith and impartial ef-
" Deconstruction has been described as the revelation, analysis, and disassembling of
texts. See BARBARA HERRNSTEIN SMITH, CONTINGENCIES OF VALUE: ALTERNATIVE PERSPEC-
TIVES FOR CRITICAL THEORY 207 n.41 (1988).
'e See Moore, supra note 30, at 949.
3 See David Luban, Fish v. Fish or, Some Realism About Idealism, 7 CARDOZO L. REV.
693, 693 (1986) (comparing Fish's themes of interpretive communities and institutionalism).
Stanley Fish, Anti-Professionalism, 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 645 (1986).
." See CHARLES PERROW, COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS: A CRITICAL ESSAY 174-99 (1979) (dis-
cussing sociological institutional school).
40 See Moore, supra note 30, at 880-81.
4, Particularly in regard to economics, American policy is often based on assumptions
that are considered to be the objectively perceived manifestation of natural law. Critical
analysis of these assumptions suggests that the purported laws are actually political and
social constructs. While they-may work and work well, critics contend that it is a fallacy to
view them as inherently superior and culturally neutral. Thomas McCraw states that
[elconomists' habitual argument in favor of free trade . . .expresses much
more than an autonomous economic principle. It carries with it a whole congeries
of other doctrines and policies without which it makes no sense either as an ideol-
ogy or a freestanding element of statecraft. It implies anti-colonialism, national
self-determination, consumer sovereignty, and political individualism.
Thomas K. McCraw, Schumpeter Ascending, 60 Am. SCHOLAR 371, 387 (1991). Though
neither Schumpeter nor McCraw's treatment of Schumpeter would be properly categorized
as critical analysis, McCraw's statement captures the spirit behind realist and post-realist
approaches.
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forts at objective interpretation are rare. Consciously or otherwise,
the positivist judicial function of neutral interpretation of laws is
naive and impossible under post-realist assumptions.42
C. Legal Positivism, Legal Realism, and Post-Realism Applied to
Insider Trading
Because the taxonomies that have been presented are to a de-
gree arbitrary and artificial, they are imperfect both in their fit
with any particular theorist and in their true cohesiveness and pu-
rity as ontological or epistemological approaches. Since they are
idealized types that can be applied to real theory and policy only
crudely, it is best to discuss their effect on insider trading perspec-
tives along a continuum that captures their generic thrusts. The
positivist end of the continuum can be characterized as acritical,
conservative, and classically constraining. The post-realist extreme
is critical, non-conservative, and relationally liberating. These
characteristics can be visually represented as follows:
LEGAL POSITIVISM POST-REALISM
[ I
CHARACTERISTICS
acritical critical
conservative non-conservative
classically constraining relationally liberating
Each idealized dichotomy is described below, along with the
contention that each of the positivist characteristics tends to sup-
port zero regulation of insider trading, while their post-realist op-
posites tend to support significant regulation.
1. Acritical v. Critical Approaches
Legal positivism is acritical in its conception of the law as the
manifestation of existing power or authority. In this orientation it
tends toward the descriptive rather than the normative. Post-real-
42 The inevitable failure of intendedly neutral interpretive schemes under post-realism
has implications for the economic models of jurisprudence discussed in Sections III and IV.
Herrnstein Smith has observed that the metaphorics of economic theory, which appear in
social-exchange theory, decision science, and game theory, are reductions of questionable
legitimacy. See HERRNSTEIN SMITH, supra note 35, at 115. The economic approach toward
jurisprudence, in its reliance on an array of typical economic assumptions, embraces strong
and usually unstated philosophical and potentially political presumptions.
[Vol. 66:373
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ism, in its effort to dissect the law and uncover dynamics and un-
derlying motives, is more analytical, more critical, and un-
abashedly normative in its prescriptions. Post-realist scrutiny
identifies political and social gamesmanship and evaluates the
quality of resulting policy.
The most recent cases regarding insider trading have re-
stricted the application of rule 10b-5. The decisions are based on a
"close reading" of the regulatory language and the technical re-
quirements of fraud. Among these recent developments are the re-
quirement of proof of scienter,4 the introduction of the theory of
misappropriation 41 in civil claims, and the limitation of derivative
tippee liability to instances of tipper malfeasance.45 The shift away
from the significant regulation approach of Texas Gulf Sulphur
reflects a swing toward a purportedly acritical reading of rule 10b-5
which the post-realist or deconstructionist will typically reject as
inevitably biased,46 and potentially dangerous with its insistent
proclamation of neutrality. Critical, post-realist assessment ordina-
rily rejects the zero regulation alternative and recommends a rein-
statement of significant regulation, justifying an expansive reading
of rule 10b-5 by evoking the ethical models discussed in Section
III.
2. Conservative v. Non-Conservative Approaches
I use the term "conservative" and its ideological opposite in
the pure and technically apolitical sense.47 For this reason the
phrase "non-conservative" is used instead of the more typical label
"liberal," which may connote intent to distinguish on a political
," Ernst & Ernst v. Hocbfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976).
" See infra note 100.
"s Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983).
" In this regard, Barbara Herrnstein Smith states that
when someone or some group of people insist(s) on the objective necessity or pro-
priety of their own social, political, or moral judgments and actions, and deny the
contingency of the conditions and perspectives from which those judgments and
actions proceed, it must be-and always is-a move to assign dominant status to
the particular conditions and perspectives that happen to be relevant to or fa-
vored by that person, group or class.
HERRNSTEIN SMITH, supra note 35, at 181.
'7 Whether conservative and non-conservative approaches can ever be evaluated in the
"technically apolitical sense" would probably be contested by the very positivists and post-
realists under consideration here. Whereas the positivist would probably tend to give sub-
stantial credence to the discussion of pure idealized types, the post-realist would uncover
the inevitable political underpinnings of these purportedly neutral doctrinal types.
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basis and may lead to confusion between the classically liberal and
the more modern use of the term.48 The conservative is oriented
toward stasis in general, and the conservation and preservation of
individual rights and freedoms in particular. The non-conservative
favors change, potentially including the expenditure of individual
freedoms in service of the greater good. The conservative approach
is interpretively restrained and intendedly objective, whereas the
non-conservative approach is interpretively activist and admittedly
non-objective. The maintenance of stasis is consistent with the
positivist's generally conservative approach to regulation. Stability
in the law requires consistency of interpretation, and consistency is
best assured by the positivist's "literal" interpretation. The era of
retrenchment from the broad reading of rule 10b-5 in cases like
Texas Gulf Sulphur reflects this conservative orientation in favor
of literal, close readings and the resolution of ambiguity so as to
preserve or conserve individual freedoms.
The non-conservative's receptiveness to change that enhances
social well-being is combined with a skepticism regarding both the
accuracy of and the motives behind ostensibly literal interpreta-
tions. For the non-conservative, there is no objectively identifiable
interpretation, and any purported efforts to discover one will be
tainted by a politically motivated subtext. From the standpoint of
these assumptions, a reading of rule 10b-5 can and should be dy-
namic, seeking that resolution which best addresses the problems,
not only as they were perceived in 1934 but also as they have de-
veloped and exist today. This open-text approach to statutory in-
terpretation gives wide berth to legal and ethical analysis. Scholar-
ship that recommends expansive reading and the revitalization of
the significant regulation position reflects the inherently non-con-
servative nature of the post-realist orientation.
3. Classically Constraining v. Relationally Liberating Approaches
Classification of jurisprudence as "classical" or "relational" is
an extension of Ian Macneil's typology of contracts. 49 The classical
view of contract favors discreteness" and presentiation5 1 The rela-
"' Classical liberalism is similar to what I am labelling conservatism in its inclination to
maximize individual freedoms and minimize social and regulatory impingement.
40 See Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations
Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 854 (1978)
(detailed discussion of contract types).
" "Discreteness" refers to the isolation of individual transactions. A discrete contract
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tional perspective sacrifices some of the order, stability, and pre-
dictability gained by the relatively rigid classical approach and in-
stead seeks the continued effective service of the developing and
changing relationship between the contracting parties.5 2 While
classical contract reduces risk and enhances the predictability of
legal applications, relational contract is more responsive to the idi-
osyncratic development of a particular consensual relationship.
The positivist approach to insider trading is to view both the
transactional contract 53 and the social contract" from a classical
perspective. In order to presentiate the rights and duties of buyer
and seller, the classically inclined legal positivist creates and sup-
ports unambiguous rules. The recent confinement of rule 10b-5 to
classic cases of fraud is the product of ostensibly close and literal
interpretation of that common-law doctrine. The idea is to read
the law precisely as it is, rather than as it should be, with the posi-
tivist and classical implications of consistency and order.
The post-realist addresses the transactional contract as well as
the social contract from a relational viewpoint.55 The expansion era
cases epitomized by Texas Gulf Sulphur reflect the open-textured
interpretive stance of both the post-realists and the relationalists.
Social consensus supports the expansive application of norms of
fairness and equality in the securities market, and the nature of
these norms evolves and develops within communities.56 The post-
in its ideal form refers to one specific exchange. See id. at 856-57.
5, "Presentiation" refers to the effectiveness of a contract in stabilizing the expecta-
tions of parties into the future. A highly presentiated contract clearly specifies the precise
obligations of each party through completion, and provides predictable remedies in the
event of breach. See id. at 863.
52 See id. at 895.
' The "transaction contract" refers to the contract of sale that exists between the
buyer and the seller of the securities in question.
"' The "social contract" refers to the conditions and terms of widely held norms regard-
ing behavior in securities market exchange.
11 See Steven R. Salbu, Joint Venture Contracts as Strategic Tools, 25 IND. L. REv.
397 (1991). The relational approach to contracts
recognizes that although contract terms are finite and circumscribed, the disputes
which arise between parties usually do not conform to these pre-existing confines.
Instead, they develop within a natural context of organic change and develop-
ment. As a result, disputes are often immune to any effective quick fix solely on
the language of the contract document. Negotiation and mediation, considering
both the document and the continuously unraveling pattern of relationships be-
tween the parties, may be the most effective mode of resolution.
Id. at 407.
56 The application of relational contracting to the social contract is an extension of
Macneil's original conception, which focuses on individual rather than social contract. The
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realist interpretation of rule 10b-5 reflects the law's incorporation
of change. It is admittedly normative, viewing the significant-regu-
lation position as a means of mitigating abuse of power and infor-
mation by insiders. For the post-realist, consistency between cur-
rent interpretation and the language and legislative history of the
rule are both impossible and irrelevant. This perspective is rela-
tional in its preference for timeliness and effectuality of interpreta-
tion over internal consistency.
III. ECONOMIC PARADIGMS AND ETHICAL- PARADIGMS
Conflicting policy approaches toward insider trading often re-
present a fundamental disagreement regarding a more basic issue
in jurisprudence: should the law be shaped using economic models,
ethical models, or some hybrid? Economic models emphasize effi-
ciency and optimal allocation of resources. 57 Given these criteria, it
is possible to justify insider trading and any concomitant disparity
of market opportunity. Ethical paradigms, which vary widely in
their application of criteria to assess insider trading, often result in
criticism of the practice based on arguments of fairness, distribu-
tive justice, human rights, and even social utility. 8
A. Economic Paradigms of Jurisprudence"
The dominant economic model of jurisprudence has developed
under the rubric of "law and economics." 6 Stated broadly, the
movement recommends that laws and decisions under laws be con-
typology has value at the social as well as the individual level of analysis as a gauge of the
flexibility with which a society believes its normative structure should be imbued. See gen-
erally supra note 49 and accompanying text.
7 See Steven R. Salbu, A Legal and Economic Analysis of Insider Trading: Establish-
ing an Appropriate Sphere of Regulation, 8 Bus. PROF. ETHICS J. 3 (1990).
11 For a general discussion applying some of these concepts to insider trading, see
Steven R. Salbu, The Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading: A Legal, Economic and
Ethical Analysis, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 223 (1992).
"' The "economic paradigms" discussed herein refer specifically to those grounded in
neoclassical economic theory, which have been the driving force behind the movement to
deregulate insider trading. I do not mean to suggest that these are the only existing eco-
nomic approaches, or that they represent the correct version of economic analysis. They are
labelled "economic paradigms" for simplicity of reference and in contrast to the "ethical
paradigms," which tend to result in different determinations of desirable public policy.
60 See generally Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency
Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980) (discussing tenets of
law and economics theory).
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figured to optimize the efficient use of scarce resources. 1 Because
social wealth as understood by both economists and some utilita-
rian philosophers is a proxy for satisfaction of composite utility
preference functions,62 overall maximization of wealth is viewed as
a legitimate and even ethical normative function of a legal
system.s3
In regard to insider trading, the relevant economic models of
law concern contract and property, which themselves comprise a
paradigm choice and 'are therefore treated further in this regard in
section IV. For the purposes of the economic versus ethical para-
digm distinction presently under consideration, it is important to
understand how legal economists view contract and property law.
In their quest for aggregate economic efficiency in fashioning
the law, economists seek solutions that mitigate transaction costs. 4
The work of Coase6 5 and Williamson 6 suggests that economic rela-
tionships are consummated with variations in the associated imple-
6, See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMics 4 (1988).
See generally Frank I. Michelman, Norms and Normativity in the Economic Theory
of Law, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1015 (1978) (discussing relationship between social wealth and
social welfare).
63 Thus, Posner states, "IT]he wealth of society is the aggregate satisfaction of those
preferences (the only ones that have ethical weight in a system of wealth maximization) that
are backed up by money, that is, that are registered in a market." RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 61 (1983).
"' The philosophical foundation behind the economic approach to law dates at least
back to Hobbes, who conceived the function of law as it relates to property as the mitigation
of failures in private cooperation. Hobbes believed that disagreement, contention, and litiga-
tion diminish the economic efficiency, and therefore the overall social effectiveness, of the
legal system. For a discussion of these ideas, see THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1651).
"I See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); see also
Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1982) (arguing that Coase's exam-
ples about underlying generalizations following from familiar economic assumptions are mis-
leading); Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, The Coase Theorem: Some Experimen-
tal Tests, 25 J.L. & ECON. 73 (1982) (documenting experimental results that support Coase's
proposition). The Coase Theorem has been formulated as follows: "If there are no obstacles
to exchanging legal entitlements, they will be allocated efficiently by private agreement, so
the initial allocation by the courts does not influence the efficiency of the final allocation."
COOTER & ULEN, supra note 61, at 101 n..
66 See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IM-
PLICATIONS (1975); Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of
Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979); Oliver E. Williamson, The Vertical Inte-
gration of Production: Market Failures Considerations, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 112 (1971). Wil-
liamson's work builds on the basic tenets of Coase, suggesting that markets and organiza-
tional structures are and should be shaped in order to minimize transaction costs. Market
activity, supported by contractual arrangements, is affected by laws that tend either to in-
crease or decrease transaction costs. The failure of markets and contracts therein can be
reduced by minimizing costs of compliance and creating incentives to cooperate amicably.
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mentation and compliance costs. These costs are referred to as
transaction costs, and they are incurred in quieting title to prop-
erty and in negotiating, creating, and adjudicating contracts
through which property is disposed. Cooter and Ulen's normative
theory of property recommends structuring the law "to remove the
impediments to private agreements" in furtherance of the basic ef-
ficiency orientation of the law and economics school6 7
In this spirit, the economic theory of contract and property
has developed to reduce three general types of transaction costs",
that tend to obstruct cooperation and thereby reduce social wealth:
communication costs, 69 monitoring costs, 0 and strategic costs. 71 If
the function of law is to maximize social wealth, and social wealth
is diminished in legal transactions predominantly through the as-
sessment of these three fundamental classes of transaction costs,
then both the substance of general laws and the disposition of indi-
vidual cases thereunder should be guided by the utilitarian effort
to create policies and decisions that minimize the costs. Abstract
legal desiderata such as justice are considered as fallout, given the
net utility maximization of such a system which creates the great-
est aggregate good.72
Economic analysis is conducive to the zero-regulation position
on insider trading. Regulation is considered both a source of unjus-
tifiable transaction costs and an impediment to the efficient dis-
persement of information. Rules that prohibit insider trading
" See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 61, at 101.
" This classification scheme was created by Cooter and Ulen. See id.
66 Communication costs are an important component of overall transaction costs be-
cause clarity of expression of rights in property and contract should reduce disagreement
costs and the associated expense of resolution. See id. at 100.
70 To the extent that voluntary compliance is uncertain, parties to transactions must
monitor them, increasing overall transaction costs, particularly under systems of surveil-
lance that are elaborate or close in degree of scrutiny. To the extent that the law can en-
courage voluntary compliance, transaction costs are reduced. See id.
7, Strategic costs are incurred predominantly during the bargaining stage, at which ne-
gotiation may be enhanced for any individual party through the assessment of the other
party's motives and predicted behavior. Because lawyers and investigative agents may be
used for this purpose, and because of time and financial opportunity costs incurred thereby,
strategy is an important component of overall transaction cost structure. See id. at 101.
" Thus, the transaction cost reduction approach to jurisprudence is considered by law
and economics proponents to be morally grounded. See POSNER, supra note 63, at 60-76.
Advocates of this school would likely contest the configuration of the paradigm at issue
here-economic versus ethical-contending that they have incorporated the ethical within
economics by defining the latter in terms of social utility. The defense of the economic/
ethical paradigm is contained in the critical literature which generally attacks the assump-
tions and value systems of a "social wealth" conception of justice.
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thereby charge unnecessary and unproductive costs on securities
transactions, reducing the aggregate social wealth by which the ef-
ficacy of the law is measured. An economic orientation also effects
the way in which contractual analysis is approached.73
Critics of the economic view of law question its fundamental
assumptions; Dworkin notes that the view fails unless the bare in-
crease of social wealth necessitates an increase in moral value. 4
The equation between wealth and value, predicated upon the rela-
tionship between individual economic utility and its aggregation
into a net social utilitarian optimum, potentially breaks down; so-
cial financial wealth may not represent optimal net social utility
because preference functions contain elements that cannot be
translated into dollars. Dworkin notes that wealth maximization
under the economic view of jurisprudence might not coincide with
utility preferences in which equitable or humane distribution of as-
sets is a highly ranked concern. 5
Posner demonstrates in his discussion of numerous specialized
areas of the law the great extent to which the law and economics
perspective is currently (if tacitly) incorporated within Anglo-
American common law.7 1 The entrenchment of an economic orien-
tation, strengthened by the widely held belief that neoclassical eco-
7 See infra notes 94-127.
7' See DWORKIN, supra note 19, at 242. Dworkin states that the law and economics
model
holds that if society changes so that there is more wealth then that change is in
itself, at least pro tanto, an improvement in value, even if there is no other change
that is also an improvement in value, and even if the change is in other ways a fall
in value. The present question is not whether a society that follows the economic
analysis of law will produce changes that are improvements in wealth with nothing
else to recommend them. The question is whether such a change would be an
improvement in value. That is a question of moral philosophy, in its broadest
sense, not of how economic analysis works in practice. If the answer to my ques-
tion is no-a bare improvement in social wealth is not an improvement in
value-the claim that social wealth is a component of value fails, and the norma-
tive claim of economic analysis needs other support.
Id.
" See id. at 245. To illustrate this point, imagine a world containing one immensely
wealthy person whose net worth exceeds all the wealth of the world as we know it now. In
this fictional world, all of the billions of other people are starving. While net wealth is
greater in the imaginary world than in the real one, no one (including the tycoon) would be
likely to acknowledge greater utility as a function of the change.
71 See POSNER, supra note 63. Posner's book does not only suggest that optimal alloca-
tion of scarce resources be the driving force behind the law; it demonstrates as well the great
extent to which the common law's development has been based historically on an economic
value system.
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nomics is itself based on natural and immutable laws,77 has created
a cultural bias toward the application of economic metaphors in
Western problem-solving.78 It is from these critical positions that
the strongest arguments favoring non-economic models of morality
emerge. They tend to share a broad-based belief that goals other
than maximization of social wealth are normatively valid and must
therefore be accounted for in a legitimate ethical system.
B. Ethical Paradigms of Jurisprudence
Ethical paradigms are broadly defined here to include all mod-
els of jurisprudence that require some analysis beyond the efficient
allocation of scarce resources aimed at maximizing net social
wealth. This inclusive classification provides an ideal type anti-
thetical to the law and economics approach.
The varieties of ethical systems against which we can examine
the practice of insider trading have been described in detail in
prior works, therefore they will be discussed only briefly here.7 9
The current examination will instead focus on the ways in which
judicial or scholarly association with a paradigm, economic or ethi-
cal, drives the ultimate philosophy on insider trading.
Non-economic moral systems 0 most commonly focus on fair-
ness of practices and procedures," equality of treatment and op-
" See SMITH, supra note 16. Adam Smith's economic philosophy fits within the context
of the Enlightenment era in which it developed: Smith claimed, through empirical observa-
tion, to have discovered natural laws of property, human nature, and exchange, according to
which the wealth of nations would be maximized. His natural law of markets, considered to
be cosmic in its universal application rather than a culturally workable economic choice, is
consistent with Posner's presupposition that social wealth is a moral concept.
7' The post-realist approach to economic models is critical of the belief that neoclassi-
cal theory is the objectively superior, scientifically indicated choice. Applying deconstructive
analysis and anthropological methodology, critics suggest that neoclassicism merely fits re-
markably well within the power structure, extant incentive systems, and overall Western
orientation created through historic imperialism. The very assumption that the primary goal
of economic policy should be efficiency rather than, for example, equality, suggests that
what we consider natural may in fact be cultural. For a discussion of some of these issues,
see MARSHALL SAHLINS, STONE AGE ECONOMICS (1972); HAROLD K. SCHNEIDER, ECONOMIC
MAN: THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF ECONOMICS (1974); Karl Polanyi, Our Obsolete Market
Mentality, 3 COMMENTARY 109 (1947).
7 See Salbu, supra note 58.
11 For these purposes, I define a non-economic moral system as one which considers
issues other than the allocation of scarce resources to maximize net social wealth. Under this
definition, a non-economic moral system may contain an economic component, and may
consider in part the efficient utilization of the factors of production. A system is non-eco-
nomic in its recognition of non-economic considerations.
" Fairness and equality are related ethical concepts that overlap substantially in the
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portunity,82 and the prescribed distribution of wealth.83 These
qualities are often discussed and evaluated under a chosen norma-
tive decision framework, which falls somewhere between teleologi-
cal84 and deontologica 85 ideal types.
Fairness of market transactions and the obligation to disclose
unknown or unavailable information have been debated for centu-
ries by both philosophers s and lawyers.8 " The legal and moral
area of insider trading. Fairness is generically defined by philosophers as "equal treatment
of equal cases," or "like treatment of like cases." For a discussion of these elements as they
relate to insider trading, see Patricia Hogue Werhane, The Ethics of Insider Trading, 8 J.
Bus. ETHICS 841 (1989).
82 Id.
83 Representative of the spectrum of theories of distributive justice are the works of
John Rawls and Robert Nozick. For Rawls, once individual liberty is maximized consistent
with the basic liberties of others, "social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so
that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached
to positions and offices open to all." John Rawls, Justice as Fairness, in W. HOFFMAN & J.
MOORE, BUSINESS ETHICS: READINGS AND CASES IN CORPORATE MORALITY 37 (2d ed. 1990).
Nozick's theory of distribution is based on the basic premise that the state should refrain
from the exercise of illegitimate coercion, including that which redistributes the natural
rights in property which are obtained by the mixing of labor with the other economic fac-
tors. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974).
84 Teleological frameworks focus on consequences of actions rather than intention. The
utilitarian model as formulated by Bentham, Mill, and others evaluates ethical choices by
seeking to derive the greatest good for the greatest number. See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN IN-
TRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 11 n.a (J. H. Burns & H.L.A.
Hart eds., 1982). Bentham's emphasis on what he calls the "greatest happiness principle"
provides overlap between the teleological approach to ethics and the ostensibly moral di-
mension of the law and economics school. John Stuart Mill's version of utilitarianism has
been noted to be less supportive of the law and economics movement, as it rejects Ben-
tham's hedonic calculus when in derogation of righteousness or justice. See James V.
DeLong, Defending Cost-Benefit Analysis: Two Replies to Steven Kelman, 15 REGULATION
103 (1981).
85 Deontology is based on the idea of universalism in formulating righteous and just
decisions. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON (Lewis White Beck
trans., 1956) (1788); IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS FOR A METAPHYSIC OF MORALS (Lewis
White Beck trans., 1969) (1785). Kant's "categorical imperative" is a rule of behavior that
the ethical decision-maker would be willing to have applied universally, consistently, and
without exception. As compared with teleological approaches, deontology emphasizes the
integrity and independent moral status of the means themselves, rather than focusing exclu-
sively on the consequences of behavior.
11 See Gary Lawson, The Ethics of Insider Trading, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 727,
737-46 (1988) (discussing philosophical approaches to information equality). Lawson dis-
cusses the question as addressed by Aquinas, Cicero, and Diogenes. See THOMAS AQUINAS,
SUMMA THEOLOGICA pt. II-ii, q. 77, art. 3 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans.,
1947); MARCUS CICERO, DE OFFICIIS bk. III (Walter Miller trans., 1968).
8 The issue of non-disclosure in contract law falls within the doctrine of fraud, which is
defined under common law as a material misrepresentation of fact upon which the victim
relies to his or her detriment. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164(1) (1979). In
regard to insider trading, the question of fraud concerns the conditions under which misrep-
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dimensions of disclosure vary according to modulation of circum-
stance; thus both philosophy and law address disparity of informa-
tion that is publicly available, of information that is hidden or
unapparent to one of the trading parties, and of information held
by one party but otherwise not publicly available. Whereas the de-
fense of insider trading is usually the product of economic analysis,
the condemnation of insider trading is typically the result of ethi-
cal examination. Equality arguments incorporate one's duty "to
serve [others] and to place their interests, if not above [one's] own,
then at least on the same level." ' Levmore's approach is to apply
the golden rule to the circumstances of insider trading, suggesting
that since none of us would wish to be denied equal access to infor-
mation, the practice is fundamentally unfair.8 9 Werhane gives jus-
tification for the proposition that "no one should profit from ex-
ploitation of important information not available to the public." 0
Moore's ethical analysis results in the eventual rejection of insider
trading, not because of the unfairness or harm that results, but
rather because it "undermines the fiduciary relationship that lies
at the heart of American business. '"91
Utilitarian "harm" analysis is the only category of ostensibly
ethical application in which the soundness of regulating insider
trading is seriously questioned. Critics have argued that no eco-
nomic harm is visited upon any relevant player,9 2 or, alternatively,
that the real problem is capitalism's employment of the dynamics
of a casino, 93 resulting in abuses that are really consistent with and
encouraged by the overall system. While these kinds of models
may appear to be an aberration of the observation that ethical
models consistently support regulation, the models are in fact pri-
marily economic in their approach. Like Posner, the authors apply-
ing solely economic utility tests argue that these criteria them-
resentation can be inferred from silent trading when a duty to disclose exists.
" See Lawson, supra note 86, at 743.
8 See Saul Levmore, Securities and Secrets: Insider Trading and the Law of Con-
tracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 117, 122-23 (1982).
90 See Hogue Werhane, supra note 81, at 841 (quoting George F. Will, Keep Your Eye
on Guiliani, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 2, 1987, at 84).
"' Jennifer Moore, What Is Really Unethical About Insider Trading?, 9 J. Bus. ETHICS
171 (1990).
"' William J. Carney, Signalling and Causation in Insider Trading, 36 CATH. U. L.
REV. 863, 863 (1987) (observing that "little harm can be demonstrated to particular inves-
tors, to markets generally, to issuers, or to bidders").
11 Roman Tomasic & Brendan Pentony, Insider Trading and Business Ethics, 13 LEG.
STUD. F. 151 (1989).
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selves comprise a moral system, equivalent to Posner's concept of
"social wealth." While these discussions all present themselves as
ethical in nature, they do not resort to consideration of non-finan-
cial utility and are therefore categorized as essentially economic
within this discussion.
IV. PROPERTY PARADIGMS AND CONTRACT PARADIGMS
Insider trading is the subject of regulatory initiative because
abuse of information is considered potentially damaging in capital
markets."' Transactions in securities can occur under varying levels
of information availability and parity; regulation is considered
when practices result in information asymmetry or disparity.
When the judicial or academic level of analysis is either property-
oriented or contractual and economic, the conclusion generally re-
stricts or disfavors regulation. On the other hand, when the level of
analysis is contractual and ethical, the findings generally defend
broad and expansive regulation.
While both property and contract models examine insider
trading in terms of "abuse of information," property models focus
on the information as it is owned and potentially stolen. Under the
gravamen of misappropriation, property analysis yields recommen-
dation of restricted regulation."5 Economic contract models view
the abuse of information in terms of its potential to increase trans-
action costs or diminish efficiency, resulting in mandates for zero
regulation. 6 Ethical contract models look for the violation of a
tacit presumption of fairness through the occurrence of fraud or a
11 The fear that information will be manipulated or exploited in pernicious ways is im-
plicit not only in the existing proscription of insider trading, but also in disclosure require-
ments such as § 16(b) of the 1934 Act, which implicitly creates an irrebuttable presumption
of abuse when insiders realize short-swing profits. See supra note 2. Section 16(b) reflects
what some scholars believe to be regulatory excess in the artificial government constraint of
naturally dynamic information markets. See, e.g., Marleen A. O'Connor, Toward a More
Eflicient Deterrence of Insider Trading: The Repeal of Section 16(b), 58 FORDHAM L. REv.
309, 313 (1989) (arguing that § 16(b) fails to serve a useful purpose in deterring insider
trading).
11 What I am labelling "restricted regulation" represents the current trend in insider
trading cases. The misappropriation theory falls between zero regulation and significant reg-
ulation by prohibiting trades on inside information only when that information has been
stolen or misappropriated from a person or entity toward whom a fiduciary duty is owed.
See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980) (limiting liability under rule
10b-5 to circumstances of breach of fiduciary duty).
98 The now classic statements of Henry Marine are the most salient example of eco-
nomic models that tend toward zero regulation recommendations. See Manne, supra note 6.
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systemic and enforced institutional inequality, often rendering a
prescription of total regulation. 97
A. Property Paradigms
Property approaches to insider trading begin with the idea
that there can be ownership rights in information.9" Since informa-
tion is often property, the unauthorized utilization of proprietary
information is a form of theft or misappropriation. If a trader of
securities uses the information of another to his or her own advan-
tage, and the trader' owes the property owner a fiduciary duty, the
use is viewed as fraudulent and therefore in violation of rule 10b-5.
The property paradigm as embodied in the misappropriation
theory is steeped in an economic rather than an ethical metaphor,
and is therefore restrictive in its application. Because the grava-
men is the unauthorized use of property, the focus is highly trans-
actional rather than macroeconomic, considering exclusively the
microeconomic effect of a trade on the buyer's and seller's net
wealth."' The doctrine that results from the property paradigm ig-
nores issues of generic fairness and equality in the market for all
players as they are affected by all other buying and selling behav-
ior, exonerating trades that are made on nonpublic information
provided that information has not been improperly acquired. 00
" See Salbu, supra note 58. Ethical contract models are being compared here to eco-
nomic contract models. The former tend to be deontological, focusing on the fairness and
equality of the transactions themselves rather than the ultimate consequences and utilities.
More teleological models, such as those which assess degrees of ultimate harm caused by
insider trading, are more economic in nature in their consistency with Posner's conception
of aggregate economic utility as a moral measure.
" For a discussion of the nature of information as an asset, see Robert J. Haft, The
Effect of Insider Trading Rules on the Internal Efficiency of the Large Corporation, 80
MICH. L. REV. 1051 (1982); Richard J. Morgan, Insider Trading and the Infringement of
Property Rights, 48 OHIo ST. L.J. 79 (1987); Kenneth E. Scott, Insider Trading: Rule lOb-5,
Disclosure and Corporate Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 801 (1980).
" The dominance of transactional economics in supporting the misappropriation the-
ory as policy is evident in the nature of analysis that restricts regulatory reach. Typically,
recommendations to curb the application of rule 10b-5 are a detailed assessment of the net
economic gains and losses realized by those in privity of contract related to the trade at
issue. This kind of transactional economic analysis more often supports recommendations of
zero regulation, so that the greater the reliance on microeconomic theory to the exclusion of
non-economic ethical models, the more severe the recommendations are likely to be in favor
of deregulation. See, e.g., David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, Regulation on Demand:
A Private Interest Model, with an Application to Insider Trading Regulation, 30 J.L. &
ECON. 311 (1987).
"' See United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'd in part, 484 U.S.
19 (1987). In Carpenter, R. Foster Winans and his tippees at Kidder Peabody traded on
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A growing movement in favor of shareholder-authorized in-
sider trading10' reflects the current entrenchment of the misappro-
priation theory as it has been derived from a property-oriented
conception of the problem. Implicit in recommendations that
shareholders be allowed to authorize managerial insider trading, as
emolument or in order to benefit the corporation, 102 is the assump-
tion that the only grounds for objection are those of shareholders
claiming that their property has been misappropriated. Economic
and ethical market integrity, in terms of investor confidence and
systemic fairness, are not considerations when the level of analysis
has been determined in advance to concern specific individual
property rights. The nexus between the property paradigm and the
movement favoring shareholder authorization is consistent with
the theory that property analysis leads to policy recommendations
favoring restricted regulation.
B. Contract Paradigms Under Economic Analysis
Economists and philosophers attempting to understand trans-
actions'0 3 and rational bargaining10 4 have been led irresistibly to
information acquired from Winans's "Heard on the Street" columns in The Wall Street
Journal prior to the publication of these columns. Id. at 1026-27. The Second Circuit deci-
sion applied the misappropriation theory broadly to find the requisite fraud in Winans's use
of his employer's column, despite the fact that The Wall Street Journal was neither a buyer
nor a seller of the relevant securities. Id. at 1027-34. The majority of the Supreme Court in
Carpenter supported the lower court's finding of mail fraud, but reached a 4:4 impasse on
the issue of misappropriation. Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 24.
The Carpenter decision can be viewed as a missed opportunity for the Court to expand
the misappropriation theory, to which it had previously alluded in Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). Chiarella, the defendant, worked for a printer who did jobs
concerning tender offers. Id. at 224. When Chiarella traded on information he discovered
from the documents he handled on the job, he was prosecuted for insider trading. Id. He
was acquitted on the ground that he owed no fiduciary duty to the corporations whose se-
curities he traded. Id. at 237. The concurring and dissenting opinions suggested that appli-
cation of the misappropriation theory would have sustained Chiarella's conviction. Id. at 239
(Brennan, J., concurring), 240-45 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The result to date is that the
relatively rigorous limitations and restrictions applied to rule 10b-5 by Chiarella remain
intact.
'' See Bill Shaw, Shareholder Authorized Insider Trading: A Legal and Moral Analy-
sis, 9 J. Bus. ETHICS 913 (1990).
'02 See Helen A. Garten, Insider Trading in the Corporate Interest, 1987 Wis. L. REV.
573 (discussing arguments suggesting that insider trading can in fact benefit relevant
corporation).
103 See supra notes 64-72 and accompanying text (discussing transaction cost theory
under generic economic paradigm).
"' See DAVID P. GAUTHIER, MORAL DEALING: CONTRACT, ETHICS, AND REASON 187-206
(1990).
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the examination of contract dynamics and contract law. The "eco-
nomic approach" to contract analysis tends to incorporate three
assumptions or some corollaries thereof.
1. The Lockean Assumption that Property Distribution Ought To
Represent the Commingling of Labor with the Property Res'015
Transactional analysis evaluates a contractual relationship in
terms of the effective and efficient allocation of rights between two
parties, such that legitimate interests in property are preserved as
well as conserved from waste. The prescribed mitigation of con-
tract maintenance costs is in the service of both net social wealth
and valid, legally enforceable ownership rights. Like the neoclassi-
cal economic paradigm from which they are derived, economic con-
tract models rank freedom over equality,106 at least as the latter is
broadly defined by critical theorists. 10 7 The bias of the models
therefore discourages regulation (i) in general, because of its ten-
dency to add increments of transaction cost to the contracting pro-
cess system-wide, and (ii) in particular, when the regulatory
scheme limits the free, unfettered activity of individual labor in its
transformation to property interests.
,0' John Locke's theory of acquisition states that rights are developed in an unowned
thing by mixing one's labor with it. Locke was particularly concerned with the relationship
of individual property rights and the potentially usurping power of the government. The
analogy between pre-Revolutionary property confiscation and the potential regulatory usur-
pation of insider trading profits is implicit in the arguments of economists and philosophers
whose reasoning is based on Lockean assumptions. See John Locke, An Essay Concerning
the True Original, Extent and End of Civil Government, in SOCIAL CONTRACT: LOCKE,
HUME, ROUSSEAU 3-143 (E. Baker ed., 1960) (general discussion of Locke's principles).
o6 The definitive neoclassical treatment extolling the preeminent virtues of freedom
comes from Milton Friedman. Since freedom and equality cannot be optimized simultane-
ously (again, assuming the relatively broad definition of equality employed by critical the-
ory), the elevated status of the former must be to some extent at the expense of the latter.
For a succinct statement of Friedman's economic philosophy, see MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPI-
TALISM AND FREEDOM (1971).
17 The conservative conception of equality tends to be labelled "equal opportunity":
the critical response is that conservative efforts at creating comparable starting points are
deficient in their failure to account for historically accrued differences that continue pro-
spectively to effect disparity in opportunity despite seemingly blind or neutral standards.
See KELMAN, supra note 32, at 114-50 (critical discussion of ostensibly social component of
law and economics).
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2. The Assumption that Rational and Voluntary Choice Should
Determine the Distribution of Social Goods, and that Rational
Actors Would Choose Disparate Distribution Proportionate to
Natural Talent and Accrued Social Endowment, as well as
Effort
David Gauthier rejects Rawls's contention' that justice de-
mands the equal distribution of social primary goods. 10 9 Gauthier
attacks Rawls's purportedly rational contractual foundation 10 by
questioning the validity of employing a veil of ignorance. Reckon-
ing from the original position warps the perspectives of the con-
tracting parties. A legitimate, rational contractual arrangement for
the distribution of social goods cannot result from artificially im-
posed fictional constraints."'
The economist's acceptance of inequality as the inevitable, ra-
tional contractual choice is implicit in the defense of insider trad-
ing. Scholars praise the expedient market dispersement of informa-
tion that occurs when insiders are allowed to trade before public
announcement can be made, arguing that markets gain in effi-
ciency as soon as rational trading occurs, regardless of whether the
basis for the trading decision consists of public or private informa-
tion.1 2 Ethical arguments of fairness and equality of opportunity
108 Rawls's "general conception" states, "All social primary goods-liberty and opportu-
nity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect-are to be distributed equally unless
an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advantage of the least favored."
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 303 (1971).
,0 See GAUTHIER, supra note 104, at 154.
'1o Id. at 150-70.
"' Gauthier states that
a principle establishing the terms of association must be rational, not only pro-
spectively but also retrospectively. By this I mean, not that the choice made in
ignorance be the choice one would make, if one could, when one is aware of the
actual circumstances governing the outcome, but that awareness of the outcome
should not lead one to judge the original choice irrational, when one in imagina-
tion reimposes the constraints under which it was made. The choice must be ra-
tionally acceptable, in this sense, to each representative person after the veil of
ignorance is lifted.
Id. at 156.
'" See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 6. While most economic analysis favors some de-
gree of deregulation, there are exceptions. See, e.g., Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen Hag-
erty, Insider Trading and the Efficiency of Stock Prices (1989) (Northwestern University,
Department of Finance mimeograph) (suggesting that insider trading may discourage gener-
ation of information by stock analysts); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading,
Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 11 Sup. CT. REV.
309 (1981) (contending that potential gains from insider trading may cause strategic with-
holding of information, resulting in reduced market efficiency).
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are quickly subordinated to theorized economic gains in the effec-
tiveness of the market's valuation mechanism. The ultimate mes-
sage is clear: any individual advantage held during contracting is
supported by rational actors who approve of systemic inequalities
when they enhance market efficiency. If there is a moral frame-
work that supports this ultimately economic model, it appears to
be a sanitized hybrid of Social Darwinism."'
3. The Assumption that Economic Metaphors of Utility Can Be
Shifted from the Individual to the Social Level of Abstraction,
Resulting in a Concomitant Shift from Economics to Ethics
Gauthier states, "What the good is to an individual, the just is
to society."'1 4 Applying the presumption that an ethical system
can be captured completely in the utility maximization model dis-
cussed earlier, economic analysts claim to provide morality through
efficiency." 5 The syllogism from which the economic-moral equa-
tion is derived can be stated as follows: Utilities measure degree of
individual good; efficiency maximizes the sum of individual goods,
therefore the most efficient system, by optimizing aggregate good,
is the most ethically sound under a legitimate utilitarian approach.
If the syllogism is accepted into the model for evaluating insider
trading laws, normative questions regarding the boundaries of
fraud and contract doctrine can be answered simply by assuming
that rational actors would choose that system which provides the
greatest good for the greatest number by minimizing transaction
costs." 6 Henry Manne's classic statement of the case against regu-
"I The tenets of Social Darwinism seem to be implicit in the economic analysis of con-
tract, although they are not identified as such given the current disrepute of Social Darwin-
ist theory. Darwin himself discussed "natural selection as affecting civilized nations."
CHARLES DARWIN, THE DESCENT OF MAN (1871). Social Darwinism has been defined as "that
enterprise or ideology, founded in the nineteenth century, which holds social evolution to
depend upon the operation of the law of natural selection of favourable heritable varia-
tions." R.J. Halliday,' Social Darwinism: A Definition, 1971 VICTORIAN STUD. 389, 404. Like
economic contract analysis, Social Darwinism suggests that unequal distribution of goods,
even when based on advantages of inheritance or hereditary talent, both reflects and con-
tributes to the future aggregate social wealth.
'" See GAUTHIER, supra note 104, at 171.
116 See supra notes 57-78 and accompanying text.
116 A law and economics approach to Rawls's veil of ignorance might lead to the follow-
ing reasoning: I don't know who I'll be and what advantages I will have once the veil is
lifted. Given that the random answer to this question could ultimately fall anywhere on the
spectrum, I can maximize the expected value of my return by approving of an economic
contract system that minimizes transaction costs, thereby maximizing the total pool of
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lating insider trading follows precisely this kind of logic. Manne
contends that insider trading yields benefits such as the expedient
movement of information through the market as well as improved
managerial performance."1 He claims as well that the perceived
costs of insider trading are largely illusory, so that allowing the
practice to occur unfettered by regulation maximizes social utility
and is therefore both the economically and the ethically sound
choice.1" 8 This kind of reasoning can be made to fit the common
law of contract and fraud through an implication of social knowl-
edge and acceptance of practices that reduce transaction costs of
contracting. Under this model, an omission to disclose material,
nonpublic information is not a misrepresentation because rational
consensus approves of the practice, understanding its value in the
economy and legitimizing its status within the boundaries of ac-
ceptable and expected behavior. From this perspective, existing
regulations prohibiting insider trading should be abolished in the
spirit of the rationally and economically efficient reconstruction of
the common law.
C. Contract Paradigms Under Ethical Analysis
Not all contract paradigms are steeped in the theory of neo-
classical economics and transaction cost analysis. Ethical contract
paradigms differ from their economic analogues in (a) their recep-
tiveness to other-than-utilitarian conceptions of morality, and (b)
their view that a consensual model of shared values can rationally
include choices other than net efficiency ends as derived by trans-
action cost analysis either because (i) moral systems should not be
consequentialist, or (ii) moral systems that can validly be conse-
quentialist would not necessarily extol the virtues of efficiency over
those of equality and fairness.
Ethical contract models do not reject utilitarian or economics-
influenced approaches to moral decision-making. Instead, they rec-
wealth. This speculation of rational behavior diverges from Rawls's more egalitarian as-
sumptions of rationality in its assumptions regarding (a) the degree to which the decision
maker is risk-averse, and (b) the degree to which the decision maker calculates the welfare
of others in choosing a system. While neoclassical economic theory typically responds to
criticism of its most basic assumptions by claiming that utilities must be measured broadly
to represent all units of satisfaction, including charitable instincts, the models that result
are criticized by others for their lack of compassion and their failure to incorporate non-
quantifiable objectives.
"I See Manne, supra note 6.
I' Id.
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ognize the diversity of ethical frameworks that have developed and
the conflict that occurs when multiple communities apply them.11" 9
The social contract governing transactions in securities is identi-
fied by rigorous examination of prevailing norms. For example,
there may be wide social consensus that rules which maximize ag-
gregate wealth are most desirable. If this is found to be the case,
then the approach recommended by the economic analysis of con-
tract would coincidentally be supported by the ethical contract
analysts as well. But whereas the prevailing economic view recog-
nizes efficiency as the only ultimate moral choice, 120 those who
evaluate the social contract ethically seek an actual democratic ac-
counting of the true nature of the extant contract.
Stated differently, economists deduce the nature of the social
contract by the application of logic to the assumptions that sup-
port neoclassical theory. Ethicists, using evidence supplied by or-
ganizational theory, are cynical of the economic deductive method
because the conclusions are only as valid as the assumptions, which
are viewed as highly suspect. 2 ' Rejecting the notions that max-
imization of social wealth is the only rational moral imperative,
and that the extant social contract can only embrace this limited
goal, ethicists reopen the search for potential contractual content.
They suggest social norms under which fairness and equality of op-
portunity may be elevated beyond the endless accumulation of
greater wealth, however gained and however distributed.22
" See Thomas W. Dunfee, Business Ethics and Extant Social Contracts, 10 J. Bus.
ETHICS 23, 25 (1991). Dunfee uses insider trading as an example to explicate his social con-
tract model. He states that "in evaluating certain forms of insider trading, inconsistent an-
swers may be given by utilitarians, Kantians and contractarians." Id. Given the conflict that
arises when these differing models are applied, a consensual ethics can be derived by finding
and understanding the extant social contracts and resolving conflicts through the use of
priority rules.
"0 According to the received economic model, (a) decision makers are rational, and (b)
the rational normative goal is to optimize total wealth, thereby maximizing net utility or
good, therefore (c) the social contract regarding insider trading approves that degree of reg-
ulation which is most economically efficient and which produces the greatest total wealth.
"' The rational actor model of decision-making has been assaulted by the Carnegie
school of organizational theorists, who have argued convincingly that while humans are in-
tendedly rational, this effort is bounded by the limitations of cognition, time, and available
information. See RICHARD M. CYERT & JAMES G. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM
(1963); JAMES G. MARCH & HERBERT H. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS (1958).
'22 The ethical approach to contract can be put into economic terms. The ethicist would
argue that the marginal utility of material goods declines as wealth increases, and that the
utility of a fair and equal system is typically undervalued by economists. Utilitarian analysis
is not, therefore, fatally doomed to be financially driven in the direction of neoclassical eco-
nomic values. Rather, utilitarianism is an ethical model of substantial legitimacy from which
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Recommendation of significant regulation 123 usually results
from the application of an ethical contract model to the question
of insider trading. According to Levmore, "[t]he regulation of in-
sider trading ... has had strong support among those who look to
non-economic values to determine the proper role of government
and the ideal content of laws in our society, but it has had much
weaker support among observers who identify with the law-and-
economics movement."' 24 In a 1982 speech, Boris Longstreth, then
Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission, stated:
"The prohibition against insider trading rests principally on the
notion of fairness-both specifically in the operation of the mar-
ketplace and generally as an ethical concept."'" 5 Likewise, the most
expansive judicial decisions in the history of interpreting rule 10b-
5 have been grounded in ethical contract reasoning, even in their
application to market dynamics.' 26 The resilience of ethical argu-
ments in the face of significant assault from the law-and-economics
camp is in part a function of economic critique. Ethicists trained in
economics and the application of utilitarian normative philosophy
have questioned the economic arguments favoring deregulation. 127
inaccurate results are derived when costs and benefits are calculated according to the bias of
the theorist rather than according to true social utility preference function.
12 "Significant regulation" refers to the blanket prohibition of insider trading, regard-
less of the source of information. The movement to regulate insider trading significantly
includes a recommendation to nullify the misappropriation theory and to render illegal all
trading that occurs on information that is not available to the public. See supra note 58.
124 Saul Levmore, In Defense of the Regulation of Insider Trading, 11 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 101, 101 (1988).
" Boris Longstreth, SEC Battle Against Insider Trading Is Worth the Effort, LEGAL
TirES OF WASH., May 10, 1982, at 16, col 3. Fairness considered "generally as an ethical
concept" implies its widespread acceptance in the framework of the American social
contract.
I" Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 847-48. Judge Waterman's decision states, in part,
the following:
Rule 10b-5 was promulgated pursuant to the grant of authority given the SEC
by Congress in Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. By that Act
Congress proposed to prevent inequitable and unfair practices and to insure fair-
ness in securities transactions generally, whether conducted face-to-face, over the
counter, or on exchanges ....
The core of Rule lob-5 is the implementation of the Congressional purpose
that all investors should have equal access to the rewards of participation in secur-
ities transactions. It was the intent of Congress that all members of the investing
public should be subject to identical market risks ....
Id. at 847-48, 851-52.
12 7 Thus, I have contended that even from an economic standpoint, insider trading is
harmful and inefficient in that it reduces confidence in markets, creates information asym-
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More importantly, the entrenchment of the prohibition of insider
trading in our regulatory system reflects a relative consensus re-
garding the social contract. Notions of fairness of opportunity per-
vade court decisions, scholarship, and journalism espousing signifi-
cant regulation. Those who fall within this cluster contend that
their recommendations of fairness and equality reflect widespread
social consensus.
V. THE EFFECT OF PARADIGM SELECTION ON POLICY
The spectrum of policy choices for the regulation of insider
trading ranges from zero to significant regulation. Scholarly and
judicial opinions on the subject virtually always address the partic-
ular concerns that have been deemed relevant to insider trading.' 8
While the manifest focus is on the special considerations of insider
trading, the latent function of a position is often the promotion of
the more generic paradigm orientations that have been discussed.
An orientation toward positivist, economic-contract models favors
the zero regulation position. Conversely, when post-realist, ethical-
contract models are applied, conclusions tend to favor significant
regulation. The use of a property paradigm rather than a contract
paradigm will tend to moderate or temper the positivist/realist ef-
fects and the economic/ethical effects, yielding mid-range policy
recommendations of restricted regulation.
The effects of the three paradigm selections on policy can be
diagrammed as follows:
metry, and defrauds all market participants, including those not in immediate privity of
contract. See supra notes 57-58. Likewise, Levmore has argued that allowing insider trading
does not only permit the moral hazard of encouraging insiders to create bad news; it also
results in economic dysfunction by reducing information "in an unregulated world where it
can be withheld with impunity." See Levmore, supra note 124, at 108.
128 As has been noted throughout, different commentators choose from among these
salient concerns. It is rare to find one analysis that gives thorough consideration to ethical
and economic issues of both contract and property law.
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The three paradigm choices are the components of a more ge-
neric philosophical orientation concerning the function of law. 129
Implicit in the zero-regulation paradigms is an orientation toward
social control. Talcott Parsons's functional analysis of the law con-
centrates on the integrative effect of law in the maintenance of so-
cial order.130 He emphasizes consistency and interpretive clarity as
factors that relate to the law's potency in effecting social control.
Legal positivist and economic-contract paradigms are internally
consistent: they operate simultaneously and harmoniously under
the metaphor of law as social control. The pure positivist's source
of legal authority is command and sovereignty.' 3' The conservative
interpretation of legal text is in the service of social control and
129 Functionalism is a sociological school that attempts to explain institutions, struc-
tures and systems by the social ends or functions they serve. For a view of the development
of sociological and anthropological functionalism, see BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, A SCIENTIFIC
THEORY OF CULTURE (1944); TALcorr PARSONs, THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ACTION (1937);
MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (A.M. Henderson &
Talcott Parsons trans., 1947); A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, On the Concept of Function in Social
Science, 37 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 394 (1935).
1I See Talcott Parsons, The Law and Social Control, in LAW AND SOCIOLOGY 56 (W.M.
Evan ed., 1962). Parsons states,
[i]n the larger social perspective the primary function of a legal system is integra-
tive. It serves to mitigate potential elements of conflict and to oil the machinery of
social intercourse. It is, indeed, only by adherence to a system of rules that sys-
tems of social interaction can function without breaking down into overt or
chronic covert conflict.
Id. at 58. In this vein, he contends that "[n]ormative consistency may be assumed to be one
of the most important criteria of effectiveness of a system of law." Id.
131 See supra note 12.
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stability. The economic-contract mode is compatible with non-crit-
ical, positivist, literal statutory interpretation. Its adherence to
non-intervention and its rejection of activist interpretation place
the economic-contract paradigm squarely in line with positivist ju-
risprudence. It is difficult to imagine the alignment of these ideolo-
gies resulting in any response to insider trading except zero
regulation.
Inherent in the significant regulation position is a view that
the function of law is to act as the agent of social change, an idea
advanced by William Evan.13 2 The post-realist approach to insider
trading is likewise receptive to non-conservative and activist inter-
pretation of the law, intended to reveal the political power struc-
tures that exist beneath its surface. The tools of textual analysis
that have been used to deconstruct legal doctrine have tended to
be aligned with the position of equality rather than efficiency,
viewing the latter as the expedient through which vested property
interests have traditionally been protected.13 3 Ethical contract
models, which are receptive to non-efficiency objectives such as
equality, support critical commentary by admitting the legitimacy
of its goals. As the positivist position arose with and from classical
concepts of contract and property, so post-realism aligns itself with
the organic conception of rights, the open texture of which is likely
to transcend the more traditional focus on individualism and
efficiency.1 4
In tandem, the ethical-contract and post-realist paradigms are
filtered into a substantial regulation position on insider trading.
Expansive statutory interpretation, combined with the legitimiza-
tion of equality goals over efficiency goals, is likely to result in pol-
icy recommendations that optimize market fairness and parity of
opportunity. Judicial and scholarly arguments favoring the broad
132 William M. Evan, Law as an Instrument of Social Change, in APPLIED SOCIOLOGY:
OPPORTUNITIES AND PROBLEMS 285 (Alvin W. Gouldner & S.M. Miller eds., 1965). Evan sug-
gests that the function of law goes beyond mere codification of customs and values, ex-
tending to the modification of behavior.
133 Whereas the law and economics movement is basically neoclassical in its economic
approach, both literary deconstruction and critical legal studies have been sympathetic to
Marxist critique. Egalitarianism is a substantive characteristic that has become associated
with critical movements. See, e.g., Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies
Movement, 96 HARV. L. REv. 563 (1983).
"I' See KELMAN, supra note 32, at 153. Kelman discusses the positivist and realist ap-
proaches to consequentialist and rights-oriented legal philosophies as they are reflected in
Western legal institutions.
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and inclusive regulation of insider trading are largely a reflection of
these more basic paradigm predilections.
VI. CONCLUSION
Recommendations concerning the appropriate boundaries of
regulation are grounded in detailed, highly focused analysis of the
particular dynamics of insider trading. Applying the intendedly
objective language traditionally valued by lawyers, judges, and law
professors, commentators strive to convince us of the merits of
their policy choices using the voice of dispassionate reason. Behind
this image of disinterested and informed persuasion lie the as-
sumptions and value systems of entrenched jurisprudence.
It can be assumed that the phenomenon occurs regularly in all
areas of statutory and regulatory interpretation. This analysis has
focused on the regulatory evolution concerning insider trading. Ef-
forts to deregulate, or to minimize the impact of existing regula-
tion, can be seen in larger context as the manifestation of legal
positivist and economic-contract paradigms. At the opposite end of
the spectrum, arguments supporting substantial regulation are de-
rived from post-realist and ethical-contract paradigms. If we recog-
nize that the real debate is fundamental and not specialized, we
can refocus our evaluation and concentrate on the true points of
contention. As recognition of the issues becomes clearer, their rec-
onciliation will benefit from the illumination of basic philosophical
differences.
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